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Utah Farm Bureau Federation (hereinafter "Federation"), 
a Utah Non-Profit Corporation, having first obtained leave of this 
Court pursuant to Rule 25 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
to intervene in and appear in this case as Amicus Curiae, does 
hereby file the following Brief. While it is not the intention 
of the Federation to directly take sides in the specific contro-
versy pending in this case between the County Board of Equalization 
of Salt Lake County, State of Utah as Petitioner (hereinafter "Salt 
Lake County") and State Tax Commission of Utah, ex rel, Kennecott 
Corporation as Respondent (hereinafter "Kennecott") the positions 
advocated in this Brief would likely result in the affirmance of 
Formal Decision of the State Tax Commission of Utah issued Septem-
ber 10, 1987, which Decision is the subject of this Appeal, 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Salt Lake County spends much of its Brief arguing the equi-
ties of whether a company like Kennecott should be allowed to take 
advantage of the Farm Land Assessment Act (hereinafter "FAA") §59-
5-86 et seq. (now 59-2-501 et seq) Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended. The issue in this case, however, is not whether it is 
fair in the abstract to allow a property owner like Kennecott to 
take advantage of the FAA by leasing property to those who*''will 
use them for agricultural purposes. For the Federation, at least, 
the real issue in this case is whether the FAA will be construed 
by the Court in such a manner as to fairly implement its purposes. 
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Adoption of the statutory construction advanced by Salt Lake County 
will subvert rather than implement those statutory purposes. 
The fact that a statute which is drafted broadly enough 
to cover all those it intended to benefit may also benefit some 
who, if looked at standing alone, might be thought to be outside 
the class to whom the statute was directed is a matter of policy 
for the legislature and not of hair-splitting by the Courts, it 
is up to the legislature to determine whether it is better to pro-
vide an occasional benefit to one who doesn't need it rather than 
to draw the qualification limits of a statute so narrow that some 
who legitimately fall within the class to be benefitted are exclu-
ded. 
By focusing on the actual physical use to which the pro-
perty is put rather than the principal business or income of the 
owner of the property, the legislature clearly chose the broad 
approach. In making that policy decision the legislature did not 
need a crystal ball to recognize that property owners whose princi-
pal business is far removed from agriculture could benefit from 
the provisions of the FAA. This should not be offensive, however, 
when one recognizes that the purpose of the Act is to provide a 
tax incentive for the continued use of lands for agricultural pro-
duction regardless of who owns them. 
In its zeal to construe the FAA in a manner that would ex-
clude industrial landowners like Kennecott from its coverage, Salt 
Lake County has suggested to this Court a construction of the 
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statute which will put at risk the very ranching and farming 
interests which Salt Lake County appears to suggest the FAA was 
intended to protect. Such tunnel vision leads only to a tilted 
view of the statute's application and fails to consider the impact 
of such statutory construction on other fact situations. As an 
Amicus Curiae, it is the Federation's purpose in this Brief to 
aid the Court in standing back and examining the broader 
ramifications of how the FAA should be construed and applied. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT L 
THE FAA IS NOT A TAX EXEMPTION STATUTE SUB-
JECT TO NARROW CONSTRUCTION. 
Salt Lake County cites in its Brief a number of Utah cases 
construing religious and charitable tax exemptions and correctly 
concludes from such case law that such tax exemptions are to be 
given a narrow construction in favor of the taxing authority and 
against the tax payer. In attempting to apply the precedent of 
the tax exemption cases to the facts of this case, however, Salt 
Lake County misses the entire point of the FAA. 
The FAA exempts no one from the payment of taxes. It simply 
requires the County Assessor to value qualifying property as Agri-
cultural land. The owner still pays property taxes. This limita-
tion on the uses for which the qualifying property can be valued 
for tax purposes is a legislative expression of the public policy 
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of this state that food and fiber production is a desired use of 
privately owned lands and is to be encouraged. 
Generally speaking, 
an act designed to declare and enforce a principal 
of public policy, and statutes declaring or deter-
mining public policy have been liberally 
construed. 
82 C.J.S. Statutes, §387 at P.917. Moreover, where a statute is 
designed with the express purpose and intent to promote the 
preservation of rights in and to private property or introduces 
new regulations or proceedings intended to promote what is per-
ceived to be the public good, such statutes have usually been 
construed as remedial in nature and given a liberal construction. 
See 82 C.J.S. Statutes, §388 at P.919. 
The legislature itself gave us the best clue as to how the 
FAA should be construed when the criteria chosen for inclusion 
within coverage of the statute was the use of the property and 
not the nature of the user. The purpose of the FAA as declared 
by the legislature is to preserve and encourage the productive 
use of real property for agricultural purposes and not the per 
se preservation of farmers and ranchers, although such may well 
be a side benefit of the FAA. In so choosing this emphasis, the 
legislature clearly and knowingly chose a broad criteria for 
determining inclusion within coverage of the statute. To riow 
ignore that policy decision by construing the broad language of 




PROPERTY ASSESSED UNDER THE FARM LAND ASSESS-
MENT ACT IS NOT SUBJECT TO TAXATION UNDER 
THE STATE PRIVILEGE TAX. 
Following up on its argument that the FAA in fact consti-
tutes a tax exemption, Salt Lake County contends that the differ-
ence between what the property could have been assessed at predi-
cated upon its highest and best use and the value at which the 
property is assessed as agricultural land, constitutes an exemption 
from taxation. Salt Lake County then argues that since this case 
involves real property being put to a beneficial use in connection 
with a business for profit, the "tax exemption" granted by the 
FAA is subject to being taxed under §59-13-73 (now 59-4-101) 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended. By that construction of 
the privilege tax, Salt Lake County would wipe out the benefits 
of the FAA for all farmland property owners except charitable 
institutions or non-profit corporations. 
Farming clearly is business and, while some farmers might 
be heard to dispute this, it is generally a business organized 
for profit. If the limitation on the use for which property can 
be valued under the FAA is a tax exemption as contended by Salt 
Lake County, then every farmer or rancher who puts the property 
to beneficial use in his farming or ranching operation, which he 
would have to do to come within the FAA, would in turn be subject 
to the privilege tax end up paying exactly the same property tax 
he would have paid absent the passage of the FAA. The result is 
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nonsensical and could have not been intended by the legislature. 
The FAA does not provide a tax exemption and, accordingly, the 
substitute privilege tax is not applicable. 
POINT III. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY DRAWS TOO NARROW A CONSTRUC-
TION OF THE PHRASE "ACTIVELY DEVOTED TO AGRI-
CULTURAL USE" AS USED IN THE FAA. 
Section 59-5-89, the form of the FAA in effect in 1985 when 
the taxes at issue in this case were levied, provided in pertinent 
part: 
land which is actively devoted to agricul-
tural use is eligible for valuation, assess-
ment and taxation each year it meets the 
following qualifications: 
(1) it has been so devoted for at least 
the two successive years immediately preceed-
ing the tax year for which valuation under 
this Act is required? 
(2) the area of the land is not less than 
five contiguous acres . . .[and] the gross 
sales of agricultural products produced 
thereon . . .have averaged at least $1,000 
per year, not including rental income . 
. . 
Four tests clearly emerge from the foregoing statutory 
language, each of which must be met in order for the property 
to qualify for the benefits of the Act. 
1. The property must be actively devoted 
to agricultural use. 
2. The property must have been so devoted 
for at least two years preceeding the 
taxable year in question. 
3. The property must contain at least five 
contiguous acres and; 
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4. Gross sales of agricultural products 
produced on the land must average at 
least one thousand dollars per year. 
The Act was amended in 1987 and renumbered with several 
provisions being substantially rewritten. The qualifications for 
application of the FAA are now contained in §59-2-503. Although 
the tests in the new statute have been re-ordered, they remain 
virtually identical. Accordingly, construction of this language 
found in the earlier form of the FAA will also determine the mean-
ing of the current statutes. 
Three of the four tests outlined above are essentially 
objective in nature. Whether the property contains five contiguous 
acres and generated average sales from agricultural products 
produced on the land of at least $1,000.00 per year for the 
immediately preceeding two years is subject to objective 
measurement and reasonably easy proof. Likewise, whether the 
property meets the two consecutive years of agricultural use test 
is essentially an objective test once the issue of what constitutes 
the required agricultural use has been determined. As might be 
expected in most cases, the three objective tests have been met 
in the instant case and there is no dispute regarding the ability 
of Kennecott to satisfy those tests. 
This case, as does the statute itself, turns on the meaning 
of "actively devoted to agricultural use." That phrase is found 
nowhere else in the FAA and the legislature has not provided us 
with any express definition of that term. Notwithstanding these 
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deficiencies, the term is not as difficult to construe as Salt 
Lake County would have the Court believe. 
Salt Lake County, arguing principally from the narrow con-
struction cases dealing with chartiable and religious tax exemp-
tions, contends that "actively devoted to" is nearly the equiva-
lent of "used exclusively for." Salt Lake County does admit that 
the property can accommodate some deminimus non-agricultural use 
but argues that such use must be clearly incidential to the unequi-
vocable primary use of the property for agricultural purposes. 
While that test may somewhat overstate the meaning of the 
subject phrase it is not the critical error made by Salt Lak'e 
County. In attempting to define the primary use, Salt Lake County 
ignores the actual physical use to which the property is put and 
asks this Court to look instead to the economic benefit derived 
from the alternative uses. Rather than look at the land, Salt 
Lake County would have this Court look at the books. 
There are a number of things wrong with the way Salt Lake 
County has structured its test. Salt Lake County has failed to 
recognize that, at least in this part of the country, agriculture 
is essentially a seasonal land use. As a consequence, the princi-
pal or primary use to which a property is "devoted" might be dif-
ferent dependent upon the time of year. For example, while the 
predominant use of corn fields during the spring and summer may 
well be to grow corn, the predominant use in the fall after the 
corn harvest might well be recreational for the hunting of game 
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birds. Should the fact that a farmer is able to take what may 
be at best a break even or at worst a losing farm operation and 
convert it into a profitable one by the sale of hunting permits 
disqualify the land from the FAA coverage simply because the money 
generated from the recreational use of the property is more than 
what Salt Lake County would classify as a deminimus? If the pur-
pose of the FAA is to encourage the continued use of real property 
for agricultural purposes. The answer to that question should 
be no. 
The difficulty in endeavoring to apply the Salt Lake County 
test to the real world is perhaps best illustrated by an example. 
Assume that the privately owned summer range of a rancher is also 
an excellent fishing and hunting area. After several years of 
battling with the public over access and tresspass, the rancher 
contracts with a private sportsman's club giving that club and 
its members exclusive rights of access and use of the property 
for hunting and fishing. The sportsman's club then assumes the 
responsibility of controlling access to the property for recrea-
tional purposes and agrees that its recreational use of the pro-
perty will not unreasonably interfere with the ranching operations. 
The sportman's club pays to the rancher a substantial license fee 
for this right. 
Assume further that the property also provides significant 
winter recreational opportunities during the season when the pro-
perty is not actively used in the ranching operation. The winter 
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recreational use might include such things as snowmobile tours, 
cross-country skiing and helicopter skiing. Again, in order to 
take advantage of the full potential of his property, the rancher 
contracts with a recreational tour company who is given the exclu-
sive right to control access to and use the property for snow 
mobiling, cross-country skiing, and helicopter skiing. The rancher 
is again paid significant licensing fees for this use. This 
supplemental income has allowed the rancher to make significant 
captial improvements to his ranching operation resulting in an 
increase in both the efficiency and profitability of his ranch. 
Admittedly under these facts, the recreational uses of the 
property could not be classified as deminimus. Moreover, depending 
upon such diverse factors as weather, the price of meat, the price 
of feed, the costs of transportation and the general conditions 
of the economy, there could well be years in which the net income 
from recreational use of the property might exceed that earned 
from the ranching operations. Under Salt Lake County's view of 
the meaning of "actively devoted to" this rancher would lose the 
protection of the FAA even though without it, continued use of 
the property as summer range in the ranching operation would not 
be cost effective and he would be better off selling the property 
for development of summer cabin sites. 
This construction of the Act jeopardizes the very policy 
it was intended to foster. An enterprising farmer or rancher who 
finds economically beneficial off-season uses and even some contem-
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poraneous non-farming uses for his property could lose the benefit 
of the FAA even though the alternative uses are compatible with 
the continued farming or ranching operation. Nowhere does the 
statute imply that the farmer or rancher must chose between the 
benefits of the FAA and compatible and non-interfering additional 
uses of the property where such compatible alternative uses may 
spell the difference between a profitable or unprofitable farm 
or ranch. 
What then is the appropriate test? The Federation suggests 
that the language of the FAA itself is clear. It is the actual 
physical use to which the property is being actively put that 
drives the decision as to whether it falls within the scope of 
the FAA. During the agricultural season is the property's primary 
physical use agricultural? Are the concurrent or off-season uses 
compatible with the predominant physical use of the property for 
agricultural purposes? If the answer to these questions is in 
the affirmative, then the property would meet the test of being 
actively devoted to agricultural use. 
Salt Lake County tries to justify its narrow test by cita-
tion of a wide variety of cases which simply have no application 
in the instant matter. Loyal Order of Moose #259 v. County Board 
of Equalization of Salt Lake County, 657 P. 2d 259 (Utah 1982*} "and 
Utah County v. Intermountain Health Care, 709 P.2d 265 (Utah 1985) 
each deal with the constitutional charitable exemption from taxa-
tion. Rushton Hospital, Inc. v. Rieser 191 So.2d 665 (La. 1966) 
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similarly deals with the Louisiana constitutional exemption for 
properties devoted to charitable undertakings• 
In the Complaint of McLinn 744 F.2d 677 (9th Cir. 1984) 
the Court was dealing with a non-taxation statute pertaining to 
the control of boating in off-shore Alaskan waters« Both the facts 
and the statute are so foreign to the issues involved in this case, 
that the citation of the case is of no precedential value. Helge-
son v. County of Hennepin, 387 N.W. 2d 408 (Minn. 1986) similarly 
deals with a statute that is totally unrelated to the issues in 
this case. 
The two Florida cases which Salt Lake County cites, Straughn 
v. K.K. Land Management, Inc., 326 So.2d 421 (Fla. 1976) and Mark-
ham v. Nationwide Development, 349 So.2d 220 (Fla. 1977), although 
dealing with the tax preferences for farm properties, involve a 
statute so dissimilar in content and obvious purpose that the con-
struction of that statute can be of little aid in the instant case. 
The only two decisions cited by Salt Lake County in which 
the term "devoted to" is utilized in circumstances even remotely 
similar to those involved in the case at bar, are of Otis Lodge, 
Inc. v. Commissioner of Taxation, 206 N.W.2d. 3 (Minn. 1972) and 
City of East Orange v. Township of Livingston, 246 A.2d 178 (N.J. 
1968). The test for determining whether property is actively devor 
ted to agricultural use as suggested by the Federation hereinabove 
is entirely consistent with the holding in both cases. 
In Otis Lodge, the Court was called upon to construe a 
statute which provided for a lower property tax assessment for 
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property that was "devoted to temporary and seasonal residential 
occupancy for recreational purposes." In construing the term 
"devoted", the Court found that the term meant "chiefly" used for 
and not "wholly" used for. The Court emphasized, however, that 
in determining whether or not property was chiefly used for a 
particular purpose, the Court must "clearly" look to "the use 
to which it is actually put, not the use or uses to which the pro-
perty may be put." [Emphasis added.] 
In City of East Orange, the Court construed the New Jersey 
Farm Land Assessment Act and specifically the phrase "actively 
devoted to agricultrual or horticultural use." The City of East 
Orange had acquired certain watershed property in an effort to 
protect the municipal water supply of the city. The property was 
clearly managed for watershed purposes although one of the inci-
dental benefits of that management was that the city was able to 
sell some of the timber cut from the watershed property. The city 
contended that the sale of such timber constituted the sale of 
agricultural products which had been grown on the property qualify-
ing the property for special assessment. 
In rejecting the position of the City, it is clear that 
the New Jersey Court did exactly what has been suggested here by 
the Federation. The Court looked at the actual physical use to 
which the property was put and concluded that the protection of 
the watershed not the growing of agricultural products was the 
predominant physical use of the property. The Court observed, 
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for example, that decisions of when and where to plant, cultivate, 
and harvest trees were not made on the basis of some market need 
for lumber but were made predicated upon a tightly controlled 
watershed preservation plan. The fact that some of the trees har-
vested could be sold as lumber did not change the nature of the 
dominant physical use to which the property was put. 
Two cases which Salt Lake County, for obvious reasons, does 
not site, illustrate the point made herein by the Federation. In 
Ritch v. Department of Revenue, 493 P.2d 38 (Ore. 1972) the 
Supreme Court of Oregon was called upon to construe its own version 
of the Farm Land Assessment Act. Oregon's Department of Veterans 
Affairs had leased approximately 96,000 acres to the Boeing Corpo-
ration for industrial research or development purposes. 2,000 
of the acres were being used by Boeing for industrial development 
with the remaining 94,000 acres being sub-leased to four ranchers 
living in the area. One of the purposes for which Boeing had 
leased the 96,000 acres was to provide a "buffer zone for noise 
suppression between the test areas and privately owned property." 
The lower court had denied special farm use assessment to 
the owner of the property on the basis that the predominant use 
of the property was as an industrial buffer zone and not agricul-
ture. In reversing the lower court, the Oregon Supreme Court held 
that it was "the use that is actually being made of the property" 
that determined whether or not the Farm Land Assessment applied. 
493 P.2d at 41. The Court found that if the actual physical use 
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of the property was for farming purposes, then the property was 
"devoted to farm use" regardless of the reasons for which the pro-
perty was actually acquired or the other benefits which may be 
derived from its possession or ownership. 
The Court in Marshall v. Town of Newington, 156 Conn- 107, 
239 A. 2d 478 (1968) was similarly called upon to review a lower 
court's denial of the benefit of assessment of land as farm land. 
The basis for the lower court's decision was that the parcels in 
question were part of a larger industrial tract owned by the Plain-
tiff. The Plaintiff had requested the zoning of the entire tract 
as industrial and the revenues derived from the permitted indus-
trial uses of the larger tract far outweighed the meager income 
earned from growing corn on the parcels in question. 
In reversing the lower court decision, the Connecticut 
Supreme Court found that it was "the actual use to which the land 
was being put, which is the criterium the statute specifies" which 
the court must look to in determining whether the land should be 
classified for property tax assessment purposes as farm land. 239 
A. 2d 481. To hold otherwise, the Court found, would frustrate 
the public policy underlying Farm Land Assessment statutes which 
was to 
encourage the preservation of farm land in 
order to maintain a readily available source 
of food and farm products close to the metro-
politan areas of the state and to prevent 
the forced conversion of farm land to more 
intensive uses as a result of economic pres-
sures caused by the assessment of the land 
for purposes of property taxation at values 
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incompatible with their preservation as farm 
land. 
CONCLDSION 
In determining whether property is "actually devoted to 
agricultural use" the test should be whether the actual predominant 
physical use of the property during the agricultural season is 
for agricultural purposes. The fact that during the off-season 
the property may have alternative uses compatible with its agricul-
tural use or may even have concurrent compatible uses should not 
deny agricultural assessment if the predominant physical use of 
the property remains for agricultural purposes. The economic bene-
fit derived by the owner from compatible off-season or concurrent 
uses should not be the test. 
It is clear that the Formal Decision of the Utah State Tax 
Commission from which this appeal was taken applied the proper 
test in finding that the property in question should have been 
assessed under the FAA. Accordingly, that decision should here 
be affirmed by this Court. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 17th day of March, 1988. 
WATKISS & CAMPBELL 
(VCc^^i 
GLEN E. DAVIES 
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae 
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